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The Enduring Local Harm from Recessions 
Brad J. Hershbein and Bryan A. Stuart 
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS 
 
n  We study the impacts of each 
recession over the past 50 years on the 
economic health of metro areas.
n  Areas that suffer larger 
employment losses during a recession 
never fully recover their employment 
relative to less affected areas.
n  Badly hit areas also have less 
population growth, and the share of 
the population that is employed, as 
well as per capita income, are lower 
for at least a decade.
n  These areas also grow relatively 
older and often become less educated, 
with fewer management and 
professional jobs.
n  Recessions play a role in some 
areas falling economically behind 
others, as employment opportunities 
shift across areas more quickly than 
people do.
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/325/.
Recessions receive enormous attention from researchers, policymakers, and the 
public. Most of this attention focuses on short-run, nationwide measures like the 
unemployment rate and gross domestic product. Tese outcomes are clearly important, 
but many of the broader and longer-lasting consequences of recessions remain 
uncertain. Tis is particularly true for how recessions afect local labor markets, such as 
metropolitan areas. 
In particular, do badly afected areas eventually recover to be on par with their 
less-afected peers, or is the economic harm sufered during recessions persistent, 
possibly putting severely hit areas on a permanently lower trajectory for employment 
and earnings? To answer this question, we examine the long-term impacts of fve 
national recessions—from the one in the mid-1970s through the Great Recession—on 
employment, population, earnings, and other outcomes for 363 metropolitan areas in the 
United States. Because the severity of each recession varied across these areas—some had 
heavy losses in employment while others actually gained jobs—we essentially compare 
worse-hit places to less-afected places, tracking outcomes for several years afer each 
recession’s end. 
We fnd that, for every recession, harder-hit metropolitan areas sufer long-lasting 
economic harm relative to less-afected areas. Teir paths diverge, and the former group 
falls behind in terms of employment, population, employment rates, and per capita 
earnings. Specifcally, an area that loses 5 percent of its employment during a recession— 
the typical loss during the Great Recession—on average has 6.2 percent less employment 
than it otherwise would have almost a decade later. Population also falls, mostly because 
of fewer people moving in rather than more people moving out, but this loss is not as 
large as that for employment. Consequently, the share of the adult population that is 
employed falls by 2 percentage points, or 1 out of every 50 people. Tis decline in the 
employment rate also leads to a long-term 3.2 percent drop in per capita earnings. 
Moreover, these persistent economic impacts are ofen accompanied by modest, but 
not trivial, changes in the demographic characteristics of afected places. Te share of 
residents aged 65 and over increases, while the share aged 15 through 39 falls. Fewer 
workers are employed in managerial, professional, and technical occupations, and 
more are employed in manual and service jobs. Te share of residents with a college 
degree falls. Even adjusting for these demographic changes, however, the majority of the 
employment and earnings impacts remain. 
Our fndings have important implications for the reallocation of economic activity 
across places, labor market dynamism, economic opportunities for workers and their 
children, and optimal policy responses. While our social safety net is mostly set up to 
respond to current (or very recent) economic conditions, our fnding that recessions have 
enduring impacts on places long afer the national economy has recovered suggests that 
targeting aid based on a longer economic history may be necessary to preserve economic 
opportunity for all. 
How Recessions Can Have Long-Lasting Local Efects… 
Recessions are periods of depressed economic activity, and they coincide with large 
cuts to employment as the demand for labor falls. Tese declines generally vary across 
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We fnd that, for every 
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harm relative to less-
afected areas. 
places because of diferences in industry specialization or in the types of workers afected, 
as well as the nature of the recession. 
If during a recession most frms temporarily lay of workers or reduce their hours, 
then employment, wages, and the share of people employed are likely to quickly revert 
to previous trends once conditions improve. If, on the other hand, a recession causes 
employers to change their production processes or shut down, there could be long-term 
scarring in a local labor market. Tis could also happen if highly skilled (and higher-
earning) workers are more likely to leave for other areas not as badly afected, or if the 
recession diverts would-be in-migrants—both people and businesses—to other areas. 
Recent research has found support for all these possibilities, but has not systematically 
examined the long-term outcomes of places badly hit by recessions. 
…and Vary across Places 
We thus look at places as defned by metropolitan areas. Tese 363 areas are groups 
of counties tied together by commuting patterns and having an urban center of at least 
50,000 people. Although they exclude rural areas, they account for between 66 and 83 
percent of the country’s people and jobs between 1969 and 2016. Tese metropolitan 
areas proxy for local labor markets, the places in which people work and look for jobs. 
(Our results are similar when we examine commuting zones, which include rural areas.) 
Te severity of recessions varies considerably across metropolitan areas. Figure 1 
shows this variation for the last recession we analyze, the Great Recession of 2007–2009. 
We measure the local severity of the recession by the change in employment between 
the national peak and the national trough—in this case between 2007 and 2009—in 
each metropolitan area. On the map, areas with darker red shading sufered greater 
proportional employment losses. Although some entire states were badly afected— 
Michigan, notably, as well as the Sun Belt states of Florida and Arizona—there are also 
several cases where neighboring areas fared quite diferently, such as Providence and 
Boston, or Pittsburgh and Youngstown. 
Figure 1  The Severity of the Great Recession Varied Considerably across 
Metropolitan Areas 
NOTE: Figure shows the change in the natural log of employment (approximately equal to the percent change in 
employment) between 2007 and 2009 for 363 metropolitan areas (Core-Based Statistical Areas, as defned in 2003 
by the Ofce of Management and Budget). Areas in darker colors experienced larger employment losses. 
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Our analysis compares 
the long-term outcomes 
of places that were more 
severely afected to those 
were that less afected, 
for each of the past fve 
recessions. 
Our analysis essentially compares the long-term outcomes of places that were more 
severely afected to those were that less afected, and we do this separately for each 
of the past fve recessions: the ones in 1973–1975, 1980–1982, 1990–1991, 2001, and 
2007–2009. Of course, the metropolitan areas that sufered severe employment losses 
may have difered in several ways from those with smaller losses, and it is important to 
control for these diferences. Terefore, we are also careful to account for diferences in 
prerecession population growth (by age group), and we implicitly compare metropolitan 
areas within each of nine regions in the country. Moreover, our analytical approach, 
called an event study, allows us to confrm that more and less afected areas were trending 
similarly before the recession; this helps ensure that the less-afected areas serve as a good 
comparison to what would have happened in the more-afected areas had the recession 
there not been as severe. 
Local Recessions Don’t Just Fade Away 
When we implement this approach, we fnd that employment doesn’t just fall more 
immediately in harder-hit areas (this happens by construction), but it remains depressed 
for at least a decade, and ofen longer. Specifcally, we estimate that for every additional 
1 percent drop in employment during a recession, employment is between 0.8 and 1.7 
percent lower than it otherwise would have been seven to nine years afer the recession 
ended. For a Great Recession–sized shock, when a 5 percent employment loss was not 
unusual, this means a long-term reduction in employment of roughly 4–8 percent. 
To be clear, we don’t mean that employment is necessarily lower than it was before 
the recession began, but that it is lower than it would have been in the absence of the 
recession. Put diferently, growth is on a lower trajectory. 
We also fnd this same pattern of persistently lower growth in an area’s population. 
Every 1 percent greater employment loss during a recession translates to between 0.3 
and 0.7 percent lower population nearly a decade later. One might think this is driven 
by people moving out of badly afected areas, but we fnd the opposite. Fewer people 
move away; rather, the population loss occurs because fewer people subsequently move 
into hard-hit areas, and this efect lasts a long time. Moreover, the composition of the 
population shifs, with the population of badly hit areas aging and ofentimes having 
fewer highly educated professional workers than less-afected areas. 
Put together, the long-term impacts on employment are greater than those on 
population, and thus the employment rate—the share of people with jobs—also sufers 
long-term declines in areas that experienced more severe recessions. We illustrate this 
pattern in Figure 2, which shows these declines for each recession. For each panel, 
the two vertical lines indicate the beginning and end of the recession (in terms of 
employment). Tat the thick blue line is near 0 before the recession indicates that areas 
have similar trends in the employment rate, regardless of how large their employment 
losses will be. In each case, as expected, the employment rate falls sharply during the 
recession. Tis decline persists, however, once the recession is over: for the 1973–1975, 
1990–1991, and 2001 recessions, there appears to be no recovery at all, while there is only 
incomplete recovery for the 1980–1982 and 2007–2009 recessions. Consequently, areas 
that lost 5 percent more of their employment during a recession have employment rates 
1–2 percentage points lower, even up to a decade later. For a typical metropolitan area of 
150,000 workers, that’s 1,500 to 3,000 fewer people with jobs. 
Policy Implications 
Te long-term impacts of local recessions also afect income, and we estimate that in 
badly hit areas, long-term per capita earnings are between 1 and 5 percent lower than 
they would have been in the absence of the recession. Tese losses are disproportionately 
borne by residents in the bottom half of the earnings distribution. 
What explains these long-term impacts? We are actively working on this question, but 
at a fundamental level, employment opportunities shif across areas more quickly than 
people do. 
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during a recession have 
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percentage points lower, 
even up to a decade later. 
Figure 2  In Every Recession, Harder-Hit Areas Sufer Persistent Declines in 
Employment Rates 
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NOTE: Figure shows, separately for each recession, the impact of a 1 percent greater employment loss during a 
recession (between the vertical lines) on the employment rate over time. Complete recovery is reached when the 
solid blue line returns to 0. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confdence intervals. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional data (employment) and Surveillance, 
Epidemiology, and End Results data (population). 
Altogether, our research indicates that recessions produce enduring economic 
disruptions to local economies, and this pattern has existed for at least the past fve 
decades. Consequently, recessions likely play a role in the shif of economic activity 
across places over time; this, in turn, has implications for economic opportunity for 
people who grow up in areas badly hit—especially repeatedly—by recessions. Te 
social safety net meant to deal with cyclical, temporary labor market disruption— 
unemployment insurance, SNAP (food stamps), and one-time cash grants—has not, 
in the past, led areas to recover. Instead, public policy may need to come up with more 
extensive and longer-term programs to help workers improve their skills, help businesses 
retool, and, more broadly, help communities reinvest in economic development. 
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